The Non-existence of the Labor Demand/Supply Diagram, and Other Theorems of Institutional Economics by Bruce E. Kaufman
ANDREW YOUNG SCHOOL





The Non-existence of the Labor Demand/Supply Diagram, and Other Theorems of 
Institutional Economics  
 
 
Bruce E. Kaufman 
Department of Economics 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta GA 30307 











The Non-existence of the Labor Demand/Supply Diagram, and Other Theorems of 
Institutional Economics  
 
Abstract: The most famous and influential diagram in modern (neoclassical) labor 
economics is the model of wage determination by supply and demand. Using concepts 
and ideas from institutional economics, I argue that the theory of a perfectly competitive 
labor market is logically contradictory and, hence, the demand/supply diagram cannot 
exist on the plane of pure theory. Four other fundamental theorems concerning labor 
markets are also derived, as are implications about the theoretical foundation of the field 
of industrial relations and the economic evaluation of labor and employment policy.  
 
In this article I accomplish four things of significance. The first is to demonstrate that the 
core diagram of neoclassical labor economics – the diagram of wage determination by 
demand and supply (D/S) – does not have logical coherence and thus has no existence on 
the plane of pure theory. The second is to deduce this conclusion using a core concept of 
institutional economics (i.e., transaction cost), thus demonstrating that the institutional 
approach to labor economics has theoretical explanatory power. The third is to use the 
transaction cost idea to also deduce four fundamental theorems concerning labor markets 
and wage determination. The fourth is to identify the core theoretical foundation of the 
field of industrial relations. This discussion also yields important implications for the 
economic evaluation of labor and employment policy, as well as interesting insights on 
the history of thought in labor economics.   
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The D/S Diagram and the Neoclassical/Institutional Debate 
 
The foundation of neoclassical labor economics is the model of wage/employment 
determination by demand and supply in a competitive labor market. Consistent with this 
viewpoint, Kniesner and Goldsmith (1987:1241) state: “The auction-market analysis of 
prices and quantities is the core of neoclassical economics.”  
The competitive model gives rise to what is undoubtedly the most famous and 
important diagram in modern labor economics. This diagram, depicted in Figure 1, shows 
how the combination of the labor demand curve D and supply curve S determine the 
equilibrium wage W and quantity of labor L in the labor market. This diagram, and the 
model of perfect competition that underlies it, also gives rise to two other theoretical 
conclusions that are fundamental to the neoclassical paradigm. The first is that labor 
market outcomes are efficient, the second is that labor markets are self-regulating. 
 
   
                                                     Figure 1: Wage/Employment Determination in a Competitive Labor Market 
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Of course, all of these conclusions are not asserted as literal statements of fact, but 
they are asserted by proponents as first approximations of reality and statements of 
central tendency.  According to Melvin Reder (1982), for example, the paradigm of the 
Chicago School (the home of the most ardent and influential proponents of competitive 
neoclassical economics) rests on four propositions: prices [including wages] are 
parametric to individual agents; observed prices are market-clearing; exchange takes 
place with the economically optimal information; and observed relative prices are not 
systematically disturbed by non-market institutions. He then declares “None of the above 
assumptions is – or ever was – believed to hold exactly, but only as a ‘first 
approximation’.” As he goes on to observe, a belief in the competitive nature of the 
economy predisposes Chicago and like-minded economists to take a skeptical-to hostile 
stance toward institutional interventions in labor markets, such as minimum wage laws 
and trade unions, for they are regarded as instruments of protectionism and redistribution 
that interfere with equilibrium outcomes and harm allocative efficiency.  
 It is unquestionably true that the D/S diagram is now a core part of modern labor 
economics. It is not only the first diagram featured in nearly every labor textbook, it is 
also the baseline model that most economists use to predict the wage/employment effect 
of exogenous market shocks and institutional interventions. But, interestingly, this was 
not always the case. Although Chicago exerted the dominant influence in the 
development of labor economics in the last half of the twentieth century, in the first half 
Wisconsin played this role (Kaufman, 2006, 2007a). The core of Wisconsin labor 
economics rests on the theory and method of institutional economics, as most thoroughly 
and deeply developed by John Commons in the 1920s and early 1930s. The institutional 
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approach to labor gradually coalesced into the field of industrial relations. The “golden 
age” of industrial relations, in turn, was the period 1945-1960 and its epicenter of 
intellectual activity was the writings of various neo-institutional labor economists, such 
as John Dunlop, Clark Kerr, Richard Lester, Lloyd Reynolds and Arthur Ross (Kaufman, 
1988).  
 The original Wisconsin institutionalists and post-war neo-institutionalists were 
different in a number of specific respects. On one central and integrating point, however, 
they were united. This point is rejection of the competitive D/S model as a useful 
theoretical construct for understanding and explaining many (but not all) aspects of 
employment relationships and wage/employment determination, most particularly in the 
short-run and without substantial theoretical modification. On certain issues, particularly 
of a long-run nature involving distinctly different types of labor and/or large changes in 
exogenous variables, the institutionalists accepted that the D/S model gives largely 
correct and insightful answers. In the short-medium run, however, where frictions, 
imperfections, and the “human element” in labor markets bulk larger (often quite large), 
the institutionalists believed that the competitive D/S model frequently gives answers and 
explanations that are incorrect, misleading, or unduly narrow and simplistic. 
 The position of the institutionalists on the competitive D/S model is well captured 
by Commons (1919) when he states “The commodity [competitive] theory of labor… is 
not false, it is incomplete” (p. 17).  He thus allows that for certain applications the model 
is useful, but also asserts that in many others the model is too n arrowly and 
unrealistically constructed and thus needs substantial modification to better explain the 
facts. A corollary to this proposition is that Commons nowhere rejects in toto 
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mathematics, rational behavior, marginalism or equilibrium (indeed, he praises the 
contributions of mathematical and neoclassical economics) but, rather, maintains that 
these methods/tools are appropriate in only a certain range of situations and applications 
(Kaufman, 2007b). A similar tone is struck by Pierson (1957) in his summary account of 
the neo-institutional perspective on wage determination. On one hand, he allows that, 
“The competitive hypothesis is useful in explaining general, long-term trends in wage 
relationships” (p. 19), but on the other also asserts that with respect to most aspects of 
wage/employment determination in the short-run “competitive theory seems completely 
out of touch with the world of actuality” (p. 18).  
The “world of actuality,” in turn, is one of fundamental and wide-spread 
imperfect competition. Richard Lester (1941) notes, for example, that “Economics is the 
study of market processes” (p. 37) but goes on to observe that “Some of our most 
imperfect markets are labor markets” (p. 43) He goes on to say “Labor markets are often 
more imperfect than commodity markets. Generally, it is easier for buyers [firms] to 
dominate the labor market and control the price of labor than it is for them to control the 
markets and prices of standard commodities. Control of labor markets is, indeed, the 
normal thing.” Because labor markets are substantially imperfect and employers typically 
have some market power, wage rates are to varying degrees administered prices, the 
terms and conditions of employment are on net tipped in favor of employers, labor 
market outcomes are generally not efficient, and labor markets are incapable of self-
regulation. For this reason, Lester concludes that there is an economically valid argument 
for labor unions and labor legislation. In this spirit, he asserts, “It is because of these 
limitations and imperfections of the market that the state legislatures and Congress pass 
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labor legislation. It is because the market either does not settle many vital issues or is 
dominated by employers that workers organize for collective bargaining” (p. 45). The 
imperfect nature of labor markets also contributes to long-lasting unemployment and the 
need for active government macroeconomic stabilization. Full employment in 
institutional economics is thus not an automatic market equilibrium outcome but a human 
engineered outcome called by Commons (1934: 120) a “managed equilibrium.”  
 Given this perspective on labor markets, it is not surprising that the 
institutionalists were not keen on the competitive D/S diagram; indeed, they used it quite 
sparingly, if at all, and surrounded it with qualifications and disclaimers. A telling 
example is the treatment given it by Lloyd Reynolds in his best-selling labor textbook 
Labor Economics and Labor Relations. First published in 1949, through successive 
editions up to 1970 the book did not include a single D/S diagram, even though three 
hundred pages (2nd ed, 1954) were devoted to “The Economics of the Labor Market,” 
including an individual chapter on “Nonunion Wage Determination.” Was Reynolds 
simply untutored in the analytics of demand and supply, or perhaps unduly wedded to a 
descriptive approach? The answer is certainly No. Reynolds published research 
monographs and articles in leading journals on wage determination and the firm’s labor 
supply curve, so he well understood neoclassical competitive theory. Rather, he did not 
include the D/S diagram in his textbook because he thought it fundamentally 
misrepresents how wages and employment are determined in most situations. He tells 
readers (p. 549, emphasis in original), “Only in theory, then, does the ‘competitive labor 
market’ provide an alternative to wage determination through collective bargaining. The 
practical alternative is collective bargaining versus wage setting by employers with rather 
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weak competitive checks.” That is, the D/S diagram suggests that wages are impersonally 
and competitively set by demand and supply in labor markets when, in reality, wages in 
most nonunion situations are administered prices set by firms with a modicum of market 
power and for which demand and supply provide only upper and lower bounds of varying 
degrees of breadth and elasticity. 
 The institutional perspective on labor economics dominated the field into the 
1960s but then gave way under the pressure of severe criticism and new theoretical 
developments. The locus of both the criticism and new theoretical developments was the 
University of Chicago and, in particular, economists such as Friedman, Stigler, Becker 
and Lewis (Reder, 1982; Boyer and Smith, 2001; Kaufman, 2007a). These economists 
were strong devotees of neoclassical price theory and the heart of this theory is the model 
of competitive markets. Illustrative of this bent is the title Stigler gave to the first edition 
of his microeconomics textbook: The Theory of Competitive Price (1942); also 
illustrative is Stigler’s (1946) unflinching and unqualified use of the competitive labor 
market model to critique the minimum wage. Stigler and Friedman portrayed the 
institutionalists as muddled-headed fact-gatherers, while they systematically sought to 
discredit all theories of imperfect competition, including not only the institutionalist’s 
model of labor markets but Edward Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition and 
Gardner Mean’s theory of administered prices. At the same time, Becker, Stigler and 
Lewis used and extended neoclassical price theory to develop a host of new insights 
about labor markets, particularly regarding labor supply, human capital, and job search. 
Besides suggesting that neoclassical theory is the more powerful theoretical tool, many of 
the Chicago theories also suggested that the troublesome market imperfections and 
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deviant observations stressed by the institutionalists are largely benign and efficient 
responses to scarcity and incentives (Kaufman, 1994). For example, Stigler (1962) argued 
that wage dispersion is an efficient outcome of imperfect information and job search; 
Becker (1964) claimed that specific on-the-job training provides an efficiency-based 
explanation for why workers may be paid a wage less than their marginal product; and 
Lucas (Lucas and Rapping, 1969) explained that unemployment is an efficient 
substitution of leisure for work in a depressed job market. Labor markets can thus be 
considered “as if” they are competitive, even though on the surface they appear to have 
significant non-competitive elements and outcomes. 
 Starting in the early 1970s, the D/S diagram – riding on the intellectual rising tide 
from Chicago -- began to make a strong come-back. This trend was most obvious in labor 
textbooks. A new genre of neoclassical-inspired labor texts appeared, exemplified by 
Fleisher’s Labor Economics (1970), Rees’ Economics of Work and Pay (1973), and 
Addison and Siebert’s Market for Labor (1979). These texts unabashedly made 
competitive demand and supply the cornerstone of labor economics. Fleisher (a Chicago 
graduate) sets the tone when he tells readers (pp. iv-v), “The analytical backbone of the 
text is neoclassical economic theory…[and] ‘the’ theory referred to is the theory of 
competition.” A central postulate of competitive theory, he states, is that “both 
households and firms view all prices [including wages] as parameters” (p. v).  He 
suggests that the alternative to competitive theory (with selective modifications, such as 
imperfect information) is a “hodgepodge of often conflicting hypotheses” (p. vi). 
Addison and Siebert position their text in much the say way. They claim that the 
distinguishing feature of modern labor economics is that it embeds the study of labor in 
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the framework of neoclassical microeconomic theory and, in particular, the “basically 
competitive model” in which “[d]emand and supply are then combined to indicate the 
equilibrium wage and level of employment, occupation by occupation” (p. 4). They 
describe the neoclassical approach as “analytical,” while the institutional approach is “an 
almost exclusively descriptive approach” that, among other things, claims “wages are not 
determined by demand and supply; rather, contemporary wage determination can only be 
understood as the product of social, political, and institutional forces” (pp. 4-5).  
 What is the situation regarding the labor D/S model today? A fair assessment, I 
believe, is contained in this two part proposition: first, the competitive D/S model 
remains the core theoretical construct in modern labor economics but, second, labor 
economists are increasingly in agreement that many aspects of labor markets are not well 
understood by the simple D/S model. So far, however, the theoretical revisions needed to 
square the competitive model with reality have been, for the most part, interpreted as 
extensions and qualifications to the competitive/invisible hand story rather than an 
outright rejection of this story and creation of alternative theories explicitly based on the 
economics of imperfect competition. This point of view is well expressed by Alan 
Manning (2003: 11), who recently remarked, “Currently, labor economics consists of the 
competitive model with bits bolted onto it when necessary to explain away anomalies.” 
This two-part proposition is also found in the recent labor textbook by Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2004). In the introduction they tell readers that they use the competitive 
model as “an operational approximation of the actual functioning of markets” (p. xxiii), 
yet a few pages later observe that “developments in the analysis of different forms of 
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imperfect competition have altered, indeed overturned, the traditional framework of labor 
economics” (p. xxvi).  
Something of the same two-part trend is found in treatment of institutions and 
institutional economics. The “old” institutional tradition of the Wisconsin/industrial 
relations variety continues to have a presence in labor economics, even if much 
diminished (Champlin and Knoedler, 2004; Kaufman, 2004a). But most mainstream 
labor economists associate industrial relations with the study of unions, not a neo-
institutional theory of imperfect labor markets, and most likewise follow the negative 
indictment of Addison and Siebert and continue to equate “institutional economics” with 
“descriptive economics” (e.g., Boyer and Smith, 2001). Yet, on the other hand, modern 
labor economics has seen a flowering of theoretical work that in various ways seeks to 
incorporate concepts and ideas that were central to the institutional research program, 
such as property rights, incomplete contracts, strategic bargaining and social elements. In 
places this new labor theory also draws on ideas and concepts from the “new institutional 
economics” of Coase, Williamson and North. This reorientation and “re-
institutionalization” of labor economics has proceeded sufficiently far, in fact, that 
Jacobsen and Skillman (2004: 11) were recently led to conclude, “In one sense, then, the 
discipline of labor economics has come full circle since its inception over 65 years ago, 
with its renewed emphasis on institutions and practices idiosyncratic to labor market 
exchange.” 
 
The Nonexistence of the D/S Diagram, and Related Theorems 
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The conventional interpretation of the institutional critique of the neoclassical 
competitive D/S model is that it sprang from a misconceived attack on the model’s 
realism of assumptions (Addison and Siebert, 1979; Boyer and Smith, 2001). 
Institutionalists, it is claimed, rejected the D/S model because workers do not have 
perfect information about alternative jobs, employers cannot make all the assumed 
calculations regarding marginal product and marginal cost, wages are not completely 
flexible, etc., etc. Institutionalists are then lectured on the methodological proposition, 
most famously and influentially put forward by Friedman (1953), that theory cannot be 
descriptively accurate but, instead, must drastically abstract and simplify in order to 
isolate the most important cause-effect relationships. The conclusion is that realism of 
assumptions is not an appropriate criterion for evaluating a theory – only predictive 
ability is -- and thus the institutional critique of D/S theory is null and void.   
 It is true that part of the reason institutional economists reject the D/S model is 
because it fails the “realism of assumptions” test. However, no institutional economist I 
am aware of has ever claimed that a theory should be descriptively realistic; rather, the 
methodological position of institutional economics is that theoretical explanation, 
understanding and prediction (not prediction alone) is improved when assumptions are 
substantively realistic (Champlin and Knoedler, 2004). Substantively realistic means that 
the abstraction or assumption is broadly in accord with, or does not violate, the core facts 
of human and physical existence and the fundamental findings of empirical research. A 
basic fact of real life, for example, is that resources are scarce and thus have alternative 
uses and opportunity costs and, indeed, the purpose of economic science is to explicate 
how an economy optimally solves the problem of scarcity. Yet the competitive model 
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purports to answer this problem by assuming away the very facts that motivate the 
exercise; that is, it assumes decision-making, information, mobility, and exchange are not 
scarce resources and thus take place with zero cost! The position of institutionalists is that 
this exercise, while admittedly promoting theoretical tractability and yielding certain 
fundamental if sometimes rarified insights (as in general equilibrium theory), cannot 
possibly provide accurate answers to many aspects of economic behavior because the 
assumptions are in direct contradiction of core facts of human existence. It is this 
contradiction that caused institutionalist Douglas North (1984: 7) to remark that 
neoclassical economics “ignores the costs of trade” and thus “is only half a theory;” it 
likewise moved Ronald Coase (1984: 231) to argue that fruitful theorizing must “start 
with man as he is.” 
 These methodological lacunas and quotations from Nobel winners 
notwithstanding, it seems a fair statement to assert that the institutional critique of the 
assumptions of the competitive labor market model has not been successful, per the 
model’s continued popularity and widespread use in labor economics. Thus, an 
institutional economist, or other heterodox critic of the competitive model, must perforce 
find an alternative line of attack. Among these, one is to question the inner logic and 
consistency of the D/S theory; that is, to show that the theory contains a hitherto 
unrecognized and possibly fatal contradiction or inconsistency that calls into question its 
logical coherence. Without logical coherence and consistency, a “theory” rapidly loses its 
claim to scientific status and passes into the realm of the heuristic or ad hoc.  
 Perhaps not surprisingly, this is the tact taken in the remainder of this paper. My 
claim is that on closer examination the labor demand/supply diagram, and the theory of a 
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competitive labor market from which it is derived, are both logical impossibilities and 
cannot exist on the plane of pure theory. Stated another way, the model of a perfectly 
competitive labor market contains an internal contradiction that precludes the existence 
of the very object it seeks to theorize. The result: the D/S diagram disappears, at least as 
an internally consistent logical construct. What is more, the theoretical deconstruction of 
the labor D/S diagram turns on one of the central analytical concepts in institutional 
economics.  
 This central analytic concept from institutional economics is the transaction and 
the corollary concept of transaction cost. These two concepts are among the most 
important intellectual bridges connecting the original and new institutional economics. 
The concept of the transaction was originally developed by Commons (1934). He defines 
it as the “legal transfer of property rights” (p. 55). His key observation is that what are 
nominally traded in markets are quantities of various goods and services, but what are 
really traded are the property rights to these goods and services. Thus, conventional 
practice is to write L on the horizontal axis of the labor D/S diagram, as in Figure 1, 
where L stands for the quantity of labor in the form of units of workers (persons) or work 
hours. When the labor exchange is consummated, however, what are really traded is the 
worker’s property right to his/her labor and the employer’s property right to his/her 
money wage (W). 
 The hallmark of a competitive market is that the equilibrium outcomes are 
efficient. To obtain efficiency, a well-known requirement is that every margin on a good 
or service must be priced; otherwise an externality results. Efficient economic exchange, 
therefore, requires complete contracts. According to Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004: 308, 
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emphasis in original), a contract is complete “when it is possible, at the moment of 
signing, to foresee all circumstances that could arise while it is in effect, and to set out 
verifiable clauses for each of them.” For labor exchange to be efficient, therefore, 
employment contracts must also be complete for then and only then will the W/L agreed 
to by the employer and employee ex ante to the start of work equal in every respect what 
is delivered ex post.  
 Now enters the transaction and transaction cost. Although Commons invented the 
transaction concept, he did not explicitly discuss the derivative notion of transaction cost. 
This fell to Coase (1937). If a transaction is a legal transfer of property rights, then logic 
suggests that transaction cost is the real resource cost of effectuating this transfer. Two 
aspects of transaction cost are widely recognized. The first is that the neoclassical 
competitive model implicitly assumes that transaction cost is zero (Dow, 1997; Reder, 
1999), which is to say that market exchange takes place at zero cost (is “frictionless”). 
The zero transaction cost feature of perfect competition arises, in turn, because of the 
model’s assumptions of perfect rationality, decision-making, information, and delineated 
and enforced property rights. The second well-recognized aspect of transaction cost is 
that zero transaction cost is a prerequisite for complete contracts (Jacobsen and Skillman, 
2004: 222). With any degree of positive transaction cost, economic agents find it 
uneconomic (or technically impossible) to write and enforce contract terms covering 
every margin of trade.   
 The great insight of Coase is realization that in a world of zero transaction cost 
there is no economic rationale for multi-person firms. He (1988: 14) states in this regard, 
“in the absence of transaction costs, there is no economic basis for the existence of the 
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firm.” Applying this insight, Demsetz (1991) notes that the model of perfect competition, 
if carried to its logical conclusion, is better called a model of “perfect decentralization” 
because the structure of economic organization vertically dis-integrates into its lowest 
(most decentralized) form in which all production takes place in single person firms (sole 
proprietorships, family farms, independent contractors, etc.).  
A multi-person firm, at least of the usual capitalist variety, obtains labor by hiring 
employees from a labor market. This necessarily involves negotiating an employment 
contract. The virtue of an employment contract is that it is relatively open-ended and 
gives the employer the legal right to direct the work performance of the employees – a 
valuable feature in a world where production is subject to many uncertainties, 
unpredictabilities, and interdependencies (Camacho, 1996). Inside the firm, therefore, the 
coordination and allocation of labor resources is performed, not by the market and 
demand/supply, but by management command and administration (an “internal labor 
market”). Evidently, the basis for multi-person firms and employment contracts is 
positive transaction cost, and if transaction cost is reduced to zero then both constructs 
have no economic value and disappear. That is, with zero transaction cost the labor 
market coordinates/allocates labor at zero resource cost, implying that management 
coordination/allocation inside a firm must of necessity be a higher cost and thus 
inefficient method. Firms vertically dis-integrate, therefore, until all firms are single-
person producers who obtain labor services, not from employees in a labor (factor) 
market, but from “workers” selling their labor services through product markets as 
independent contractors, consultants, sole proprietorships, and so forth. In this zero 
transaction cost world, the Ford Motor Company still exists and produces millions of 
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cars, but it comprises only one person – Henry Ford – who buys needed labor services 
from (and rents portions of the capital stock to) several hundred thousand sole proprietors 
and independent contractors doing business as “John Jones Windshield Installation, Inc.” 
and “Sue Smith Auto Marketing Services, Corp.”   
The logical contradiction in the model of a perfectly competitive labor market is 
now well in sight. A “labor market,” as conventionally defined, presumes an employment 
relationship; that is, the firms’ demand for labor is a demand for employees who work in 
these companies and follow the employers’ directions, while the supply of labor comes 
from persons willing to work as employees and take orders in return for a money wage 
per time period. Illustrative of this presumption, Hamermesh in his book Labor Demand 
(1993, p. 3, emphasis in original) states, “the demand for labor is any decision made by 
an employer regarding the company’s workers – their employment, their compensation, 
and their training.” In a similar vein, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 327, emphasis 
added) state, “The study of labor markets, employment, and wages is a major element of 
standard neoclassical economics.” But in a world of zero transaction cost, no employment 
relationship exists and thus no labor market exists (Kaufman, 2007c). And, if no labor 
market exists, the labor demand/supply diagram pictured in Figure 1 also cannot exist. In 
perfect competition, the logic of the theory implies that the labor D/S diagram disappears! 
In its place appears a different D/S diagram with Price and Quantity on the axes and 
where labor services in the form of intermediate goods are exchanged in a competitive 
product market. The perfectly competitive economy still generates the Pareto optimal 
level of goods and services, but it does so without the institutions called a labor market 
and employment relationship.  
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 The converse situation is equally revealing. A labor market and employment 
relationship can only exist in a world of positive transaction cost. But this world is 
characterized by imperfect (bounded) rationality and decision-making, imperfect 
information, and imperfectly delineated and enforced property rights. As a result, 
employment contracts are also incomplete, giving rise to sources of inefficiency such as 
principal-agent problems, moral hazard and strategic bargaining.1 Hence, institutional 
theory gives rise to this fundamental theorem: labor markets are inherently and always 
and everywhere imperfectly competitive. A corollary implication concerns the theoretical 
foundation of the field of industrial relations. When originally founded in the 1920s, the 
field of industrial relations was defined as “the study of the employment relationship” 
(Kaufman, 2004: 95-95). Since an employment relationship only exists with positive 
transaction cost, one can say that industrial relations is the labor economics of positive 
transaction cost (ibid., p. 105).  
The focus on imperfect competition brings us back to the core proposition of this 
paper – that the competitive labor D/S diagram has no theoretical existence. In a world of 
zero transaction cost, the diagram disappears because the economy has no labor market or 
employment relationship. In a world of positive transaction cost, the diagram also 
disappears because the labor demand curve becomes ill-defined. It does so in this case, 
not because of an internal logical contradiction, but because modeling human agents with 
substantive realism (“as they really are”) creates conditions of bounded rationality, 
imperfect information and fundamental uncertainty that give rise to positive transaction 
cost, imperfect competition, and theoretical inability to generate a well-defined 
(monotonic, deterministic) labor demand curve.2 
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An essential condition for deriving the D/S diagram is that labor is homogeneous 
(like a commodity). But this condition is inevitably violated with an employment 
relationship. The reason stems from the impossibility of separating the supply of labor 
services from the seller (a form of indivisibility); that is, the employer and the employee 
necessarily have a personal relationship at the point of production. This fact, coupled 
with search and mobility costs due to imperfect information, makes incumbent employees 
preferable to job candidates in the external labor market and, accordingly, causes the 
labor supply curve of firms to slope upward (Manning, 2003). An upward sloping labor 
supply curve creates a condition of imperfect competition in labor markets akin to 
monopsony (broadly defined to include any source of costly/impeded mobility). Standard 
theory shows, in turn, that in a monopsony labor market the firm has a well-defined 
marginal revenue product schedule but not a well-defined labor demand curve (because 
the level of employment at every W is also determined by the firm’s rising marginal cost 
of labor schedule), just as a monopolist in the product market has a well-defined marginal 
cost curve but not a well-defined market supply curve (Fleischer and Kniesner, 1980: 
198). Thus, without a well-defined labor demand curve the competitive D/S diagram in 
Figure 1 again disappears (or is half-empty).  
 This conclusion leads to additional theorems and implications. In the positive 
transaction cost world of institutional economics, labor markets are always and 
everywhere imperfectly competitive. Wage rates, therefore, are market influenced but not 
market determined. An alternative institutional process, therefore, sets wage rates and the 
other terms and conditions of employment. In nonunion labor markets, employers have a 
modicum of market power and administratively set the wage rate, perhaps complemented 
 19
by an element of bilateral negotiation for employees with scarce/valuable knowledge and 
skills; in organized labor markets wage rates are bilaterally set through collective 
bargaining or some method of joint determination. Accordingly, the second fundamental 
theorem of institutional labor economics is: wage rates are always and everywhere an 
administered and/or bargained price. The third is: in nonunion labor markets bargaining 
power in wage determination tends to be tipped in favor of employers. In an earlier era 
this idea went under the rubric “labor’s inequality of bargaining power” (Kaufman, 
1989). The fourth is: wage rates are incapable of self-equilibrating labor markets, 
particularly in a condition of excess supply. This fourth theorem establishes the close 
theoretical link between institutional economics and Keynesian economics. This theorem 
arises not only because wage rates lack the requisite flexibility to re-balance labor 
demand and supply in the face of negative exogenous shocks but also because a cut in 
money wages typically does not make labor cheaper since work effort and productivity 
fall commensurately (Slichter, 1929; Bewley, 1999; Fehr and Falk, 1999). This 
consideration is omitted from the neoclassical competitive model since it treats labor as a 
commodity and the worker’s marginal product as a technologically determined datum.  
 If labor markets are inherently imperfect, certain revisionist implications also 
arise concerning the economic effects of institutional interventions such as trade unions 
and protective labor law (e.g., a minimum wage). The neoclassical approach to evaluating 
these institutions is to begin with “assume a competitive labor market” and then use 
Figure 1 to work out the economic effects and welfare implications. Not surprisingly, the 
verdict is negative and, indeed, such is foreordained by the assumptions of the theory. If 
one starts with a model of a perfect (frictionless) economy, demand and supply have 
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already efficiently allocated resources and any institutional intervention such as a trade 
union or minimum wage law must necessarily work harm. Obviously, if labor markets 
are substantively imperfect and the Figure 1 model of competitive demand and supply is 
replaced by another figure with (say) a monopsony model, one may well derive different 
conclusions about both the economic effects and welfare benefits of these institutions 
(e.g., Mitchell and Erickson, 2007; Kaufman, 2007d).3 It is thus no wonder that 
institutional economists and industrial relationists have long found a stronger public 
interest rationale for unions and protective labor law since they start the analysis with the 
presumption that labor markets are imperfect. Illustratively, John Dunlop recently 
declared “I reject out of hand any argument that the economy would be better off without 
unions. Unions do not come into the picture and distort some ‘perfect’ wage structure, 
because there is no such thing. In the real world there are all kinds of distortions and 
inequities built into the wage structure, as any person who sets wages knows” (quoted in 




A theory can be evaluated by two standards: its internal logical consistency and its ability 
to explain and predict empirically observed facts. A good theory passes both tests. In this 
paper I have examined how well the neoclassical competitive labor D/S model passes the 
first test. I claim to show that it fails. It fails the test of logical consistency because its 
assumptions lead to the contradictory conclusion that a competitive labor market cannot 
exist in any possible state of the world. This conclusion means, in turn, that the most 
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famous and influential diagram in modern (neoclassical) labor economics – the model of 
wage determination by demand and supply – does not have a solid microeconomic 
foundation. In one state of the world (zero transaction cost), the diagram disappears 
altogether; in the second state (positive transaction cost) one-half of the diagram 
disappears due to lack of a well-defined labor demand curve.  
 This finding, I believe, is noteworthy. So too is the way it is derived. Institutional 
economics has long been derided for lacking theory. Unarguably institutional economics 
lacks the same well-developed body of formal (analytic) theory as possessed by 
neoclassical economics, partly due to its insistence on staying closer to reality. One can 
debate the fruitfulness of this methodological position; what I have endeavored to 
establish is the lower-order proposition that institutional economics does have theoretical 
concepts and content and these concepts can be used to derive interesting and meaningful 
insights and hypotheses. In this paper I have used the institutional concept of the 
transaction and corollary concept of transaction cost. By so doing, I claim to show that 
the competitive labor market model and D/S diagram are logical impossibilities. But 
these concepts yield a much richer harvest than just this. In the world of reality (positive 
transaction cost), institutional economics leads to four fundamental theorems about labor 
markets and employment relationships: (1) labor markets are always and everywhere 
imperfect; (2) wage rates are always and everywhere administered and/or bargained 
prices; (3) in nonunion labor markets bargaining power in wage determination tends to be 
tipped in favor of employers; and (4) wage rates are incapable of self-equilibrating labor 
markets and restoring full employment after a significant negative demand shock.  
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 I have argued elsewhere (Kaufman, 2004b, 2006) that industrial relations is 
essentially the labor (Wisconsin) branch of institutional economics. Not coincidentally, 
the academic father of both is Commons. Industrial relations, like institutional 
economics, has lacked much in the way of theory and, in recent years, even a firm 
conviction on exactly what intellectual territory it encompasses (Strauss and Whitfield, 
1998). It has not been the purpose of this paper to examine this issue at length, but an 
important implication emerges that is worth stating. As envisioned by Commons and 
other early participants in the field, industrial relations is the study of the employment 
relationship and the labor problems that grow out of this relationship. With this in mind, 
one way to view industrial relations is that it is the labor economics of positive 
transaction cost. Only with positive transaction cost, after all, does an employment 
relationship exist and only with positive transaction cost are there imperfect labor 
markets and attendant labor problems. So viewed, neoclassical economics, or at least the 
competitive version championed by Chicago, is necessarily the mortal enemy of 
industrial relations for by its very assumptions it eliminates as substantively interesting 
phenomena the labor problems and employment relationship that form the core of 
industrial relations and provide the field with its intellectual and practical raison d’etre.  
 I wish to end on a note of moderation and pragmatism. It is firmly my conviction 
that the labor D/S diagram is a useful teaching and research tool for understanding how 
labor markets work, particularly at an “Econ 101” level or for purposes of long-run 
analysis of major demand/supply shifts. Certainly our science would be poorer without it. 
In this regard, I think I am largely hewing to the position taken by earlier generations of 
institutional economists and industrial relationists. None have taken the position that the 
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diagram is useless, and many believe it provides real insight. I am definitely in the latter 
camp. Nonetheless, it is also my position that the competitive labor model has been too 
uncritically accepted by mainstream labor economists and its hegemonic use in 
evaluating labor and employment policy has led to overly narrow and conservatively 
biased conclusions (Kaufman, 2007d).  
In the end, the debate about the competitive labor D/S model likely comes down 
to an assessment of how well or how badly it fits the facts and explains/predicts 
important labor market outcomes. This takes us to the second test (the “useful tool” test) 
of a theory noted above. I do not endeavor to address this question in this paper, so it 
must wait for another day. My impression, however, is that in many critical respects the 
competitive model will fail the test, or at least a strong test. But this is conjecture. What is 
not conjecture is that on purely theoretical grounds the competitive D/S model does not 
have a strong microeconomic foundation and thus passes from a logical proposition to a 
heuristic device.   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 This point was early recognized by institutional economists, for Commons (1919: 22-23) remarks, “The 
labor contract…is a new contract every day and every hour… The laborer is bargaining while he is 
working.” 
 
2 Probably if challenged to cite a fundamental prediction of neoclassical labor economics, and one that has 
empirical verification, most labor economists would cite the law of demand in labor markets and the 
numerous studies that find an inverse relationship between the wage rate and quantity demanded of labor 
(ceteris paribus). But as Becker (1962) has demonstrated, this law is a fact of scarcity, not a particular 
theory, and holds with either a model of a rational or irrational economic agent (a distinction suggestively 
but not literally approximating the division between orthodox and heterodox economics). Thus, the law of 
demand is generic to economics; the difference between neoclassical and institutional economics is that the 
former presumes this to be a tight, deterministic inverse relationship and the latter – in part because it 
embeds labor demand in an environment of imperfect competition --  allows for a modicum of 
indeterminacy, non-response, and even a positive relationship over a modest range, causing the measured 
demand elasticity to move closer to zero, or even to take a positive value (as in Card and Krueger, 1995).  
 
3 It is incorrect and far too narrow to identify the institutional theory of imperfect labor markets with 
monopsony per se, although monopsony is certainly one case nested within the institutional framework. 
Elsewhere (Kaufman, 2004a) I have listed what I consider to be the seven core features of the institutional 
view of labor markets.  The most important of these is a behavioral (psychologically informed) model of 
the human agent, for such is a theoretical prerequisite for generating positive transaction cost.  
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